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Abstract: The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate
governance (CG), in terms of its internal significance, and cost of capital (COC),
based on a sample of listed firms of Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) over the
period of 2009–2015. We used Pakistan as a case study mainly because we
expect that key features of Pakistani setting in terms of CG and financial markets
will have impact on the relationship between CG and COC. Drawing on a sample
of 120 PSX listed firms, we find that CG compliance and disclosure (CG index
[CGI]) has improved over time among PSX listed firms. The findings also reveal
a positive relationship of institutional, government and director ownership with
both CGI and COC, while this relationship becomes negative with block owner-
ship. The findings of 2SLS reveal a significant negative association between CG
compliance and COC; hence, firms with higher CG score enjoy a lower COC.
Interestingly, gender diversity and board size have a negative association with
CG compliance and COC, while audit firm size reveals a positive association with
CG compliance and disclosure while a negative association with COC. The study
contributes to existing literature dealing with CG and determinant of firm value
(COC) in emerging markets, particularly in Pakistan, which has not been exten-
sively explored in existing research.
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1. Introduction
The last decade witnessed the expeditiously growing trend in corporate governance (CG) code
promulgation and espousal by a number of countries around the globe. However, two diverse
mechanisms for code implementation have been espoused in the world, i.e. hard and soft regula-
tions. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) advocated that the governance structures and charac-
teristics have been swayed by CG reforms diffused in the former decade. Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2008) also conclude that governance structure has been rehabilitated globally after CG
reforms. Pakistan follows the Anglo-Saxon tradition of common law as the basis for its commercial
laws (Ibrahim, 2006). The CG compliance level has significant dissimilarities reliant upon the nature
of the country’s internal and external governance mechanisms and rule of law.
It is well supported from exisiting literature that effective governance mechanisms retain
investors’ confidence and reduce cost of capital (COC). The good CG regulations and rules persuade
prospect investors to make investment decision in both local and international equity markets. It is
also acknowledged that CG practices have numerous benefits for both developed and emerging
countries like Pakistan. Consequently, these practices also provide support to emerging economies
in getting sustainable and higher growth rates. Furthermore, these practices are supportive in
mobilizing savings and increasing the ability of the capital market to boost investors’ confidence in
the national economy of the country. Researchers also documented that this helps in raising
investment rates and emboldens growth by protecting the rights of both small and large investors
(Attiya, Javid, & Iqbal, 2008; Rwegasira, 2000). The Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
(SECP) introduced code of corporate governance (CCG) in 2002 with many voluntary provisions, and
SECP revised and issued a revised CCG in 2012, in which transparency and disclosure have gained
the substantial attention by defining criteria for internal head of audit committee, evaluation of
board and establishing the director’s remuneration procedure.
In Pakistan, the main problem is the compliance of CG code. After contemporary reform in
2012, CCG has many mandatory provisions related to auditing, board structure and disclosure
for listed companies; however, there are still some voluntary provisions. Due to high owner-
ship concentration, these provisions challenge the discretionary power of state and families.
Consequently, they are diffident to perceive the CG code in its true essence, and the com-
pliance of CCG is only in a form not in substance. A recent study conducted by Khan (2014)
documented that most of the provisions are ticked just in box, not in true sense. He also
documented that senior officer of SECP confirmed that CCG is not implemented in true sense
as most of the public listed firms are family owned in Pakistan. The family members are
elected as executive and non-executive directors. Moreover, the firms also appoint family
members as independent directors with few shares. Most of the firms are appointing their
children as independent directors with few shares to fulfill the requirement of CCG. A number
of studies have been conducted in Pakistan to investigate the nexus between CG mechanisms
and firm behavior, but these studies are limited to financial performance (Attiya et al., 2008;
Qaiser, 2011; Shaheen & Nishat, 2005; Tariq & Abbas, 2013) and dividend policy (Afzal &
Sehrish, 2011; Ahmed & Javid, 2009). Only few studies investigated the relationship between
CG and COC in Pakistan (Hasan & Butt, 2009; Khan, 2016; Shah & Butt, 2009) and around the
globe (Byun, Kwak, & Hwang, 2008; Derwall & Verwijmeren; Pham, Suchard, & Zein, 2012;
Reverte, 2009; Tran, 2014).
This study investigates the level of CG compliance and its determinants among PSX listed firms.
Moreover, the study also investigates the nexus between CG compliance and COC. Drawing on
a sample of 120 PSX listed firms over the period of 2009–2015, this study attempts to achieve
three objectives. First, a CG compliance index is constructed with provisions of both CCG 2002 and
2012 of Pakistan to determine the level of CG compliance and disclosure. Second, the study
investigates the determinants of CG compliance and disclosure. In the end, the study investigates
the nexus between CG compliance and COC. The theoretical rationale of investigating the nexus
between CG and COC is based on agency theory (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
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The present study has several implications and fills the gap in existing literature. The present
study employs a self-constructed CG index (CGI) comprising of 75 provisions from both CCG 2002
and recent reform in 2012 that is ignored in prior studies (Javid & Iqbal, 2008b); hence, it will be
the first study which considers CCG 2012. Furthermore, prior studies deliberated small sample and
shorter time period (Hasan & Butt, 2009; Tariq & Abbas, 2013), while this study is comprehensive
and takes a sample of 120 PSX listed firms for a longer period (7 years) to find more robust results.
Most of the prior studies investigated the relationship between CG and financial performance
measured by return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q (Attiya et al., 2008;
Shaheen & Nishat, 2005; Tariq & Abbas, 2013) and found inclusive results, while this study
investigates the CG mechanisms and COC by employing a self-constructed CGI that will help in
understanding the relationship with underlying variables. In addition, prior studies have explored
only traditional determinants of CG compliance among PSX listed firms, while this study adds and
investigates new determinants other than the traditional determinant like gender diversity to
understand the gender role in CG compliance and COC. In the end, the study also sheds lights
on the appropriateness of the Anglo-American model of CG in Pakistan due to difference in
socioeconomic factors. The next section provides a literature review of CG and level of CG
compliance in developed and developing countries.
2. Literature review
CG can be defined in a narrow sense that emphasized on shareholder values; therefore, it is applied
to warrant that the company is acting on behalf of its shareholders to increase their wealth. The
whole process of accountability and decision-making has ended up and revolves around profit-
maximizing and increasing values of shares. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) defined CG in a narrow
sense. They documented that “Corporate governance is a set of mechanisms through which
outside investors protect themselves from expropriation of insiders” (p. 1).
Recently, many countries have introduced CG codes to enhance CG practices, especially to
improve transparency, accountability and disclosure (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009;
Bouwman, 2011) among firms. Therefore, researchers also paid close attention to examine factors
influencing CG disclosure (Allegrini & Greco, 2013). Additionally, researchers also found that
development in CG is still progressing due to some cultural and regional differences among
countries which affect implementation and compliance of CG code (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003;
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ntim & Danbolt, 2012); hence, the level of CG compliance differs
(MacNeil & Li, 2006; Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, & Stapleton, 2012).
2.1. Level of CG compliance in developed countries
Exisiting literature provides the evidence that the level of CG compliance is high in developed
countries. Werder, Talaulicar, and Kolat (2005) conducted a study among German firms to inves-
tigate the level of CG compliance. They used a sample of 408 German firms for the year 2003 and
found a high level of CG compliance in listed firms of Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Correspondingly,
Cromme (2005) also conducted a study among German listed firms to investigate the compliance
of CG principles in 2003. He found that 75% of the listed firms were complying with good CG
principles. In 2010, Hegazy and Hegazy (2010) conducted a study among UK firms to determine CG
compliance. They found about 70% average level of CG compliance from annual reports of the year
2008.
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) conducted a study by taking a sample of non-financial listed
firms of the UK. They took 130 firms as a sample of study over the year 2003–2009 and found
a high level of CG compliance with CG quotient. On the basis of the above studies, it can be argued
that UK firms are improving disclosure and governance practices by following the UK combined
code. Allegrini and Greco (2013) conducted a study among Italian listed companies. They devel-
oped an index with 60 provisions of CG from the 2007 Italian civil governance code. They
documented that the level of governance practices and voluntary disclosure has increased
among Italian listed companies. Correspondingly, Salterio, Conrod, and Schmidt (2013) conducted
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a study among Canadian listed firms. They took a sample of 742 Canadian listed firms and used 16
CG recommendations. They found that 39% of the firms were complying with all the 16 recom-
mendations of good CG, while 81% of the firms were complying with some recommendations of
good CG practices. In sum, the level of CG compliance is high among developed countries due to
having strong cultural, economic and legal systems (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Salterio
et al., 2013).
2.2. Level of CG compliance in developing countries
Researchers found extensive inequality with level of compliance with CG disclosure among devel-
oping countries (Solomon, 2010). Samaha et al. (2012) documented that the level of CG compli-
ance varies according to the type of government at the country level. Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros
(2006) conducted a study by taking a sample of 160 Cyprus listed firms for the year 2002. They
found that only a marginal number of firms was complying with CG provisions. The CG code was
introduced in 2002 in Cyprus, and it might be a possible reason for these findings. Additionally,
researchers also documented that appropriate time is required for the implementation of CG
reforms to improve CG practices (Renders, Gaeremynck, & Sercu, 2010). Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu,
and Onumah (2007) conducted a study to determine the level of CG compliance in listed firms of
Ghana. They took a sample of 22 firms over the period of 2001 to 2002 and developed a CGI. They
found 52% average score for disclosure and transparency. In contrast, some studies found
a comparative improved level of CG compliance after the introduction of CG code in some devel-
oping countries. Researchers conducted a study to determine the level of corporate disclosure in
Portuguese firms (Alves & Mendes, 2004). They documented a significant improvement in CG
compliance after the introduction of Portuguese CG code in 1999. In contrast, Barako, Hancock,
and Izan (2006) found a gradual rise in the level of CG compliance among 54 listed firms of Kenya
for the year 1999 after the introduction of CG principles. Additionally, Chalevas (2011) conducted
a study among Greek companies to determine the level of compliance with CG standards from
the year 2000 to 2003. He found that the level of CG compliance improved among Greek compa-
nies for the investigated period. Similarly, Ntim and Danbolt (2012) conducted a study to deter-
mine the effect of King II report on CG practices and developed CGI with 50 provisions by taking
a sample of 169 South African listed firms. They found improvement in CG standards after the
release of King II report in 2002, specifically, the level of CG compliance increased up to 69% in
2006 which was 47% in 2002.
Moreover, there are some cross-countries studies that determined and compared the CG com-
pliance among different countries. In 2002, researchers conducted a study among 19 emerging
markets to investigate CG compliance level. They took 354 firms over the period 1998 –2000. They
documented that South African and Asian markets have considerably high level of disclosure and
transparency as compared to Eastern Europe, Latin America and Middle East markets.
Furthermore, Klapper and Love (2004) employed Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) index to
find variation in firm-level governance disclosures. They draw a sample from 14 developing
countries for the year 2000. They found prodigious variation in firm-level governance disclosures.
As discussed above, it can be summarized that variances in compliance with CG standards are due
to differences in the cultural, social and legal system of countries (Arslan & Roudaki, 2017; Haniffa
& Hudaib, 2006; Ntim & Danbolt, 2012). It can also conclude that CG compliance has been
improved with the introduction of CCG in some countries. In a similar vein, Bozec, Dia, and Bozec
(2010) documented that developing countries adopt good CG practices to attract more investors as
they are already suffering from the weak legal system in the country.
After issuance of CG code in March 2002, very few research studies have been conducted to
determine CG compliance in Pakistan (Javid & Iqbal, 2008a; Khan, 2016; Tariq & Abbas, 2013);
furthermore, these studies only undertook the CG code 2002 and determined the CG compliance
by considering less number of CG provisions and took small sample size. Javed and Iqbal (2007)
examined the CG compliance by taking 50 listed firms of Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) over the
period of 2003–2005. They only constructed the CGI by taking 22 provisions and found possible
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improvement in the level of compliance and disclosure. These few provisions may not represent
the level of CG compliance in true form. Additionally, Javid and Iqbal (2008a) conducted a study to
examine CG standards among 50 KSE listed companies for the period of 2003–2007. They docu-
mented that CG quality improved due to the monitoring of SECP. Recently, Tariq and Abbas (2013)
employed a weighted index consisting of 50 provisions for 119 PSX listed firms over the period of
2003–2010. They documented that although CG compliance and disclosure have improved since
the issuance of CG code in 2002, CG code is still minimal. The above studies have some limitations
in the shape of fewer provisions, methodology and fewer observations. All of these studies only
considered the CG code 2002. This study addresses these limitations by employing a self-
constructed CGI with more provisions to determine the level of CG compliance and determinants
of CG compliance among PSX listed firms and investigates the nexus between CG compliance and
COC. The next section presents the relationship between CGI and COC.
2.3. CG disclosure and cost of capital
In prior literature, researchers highlighted the difference in the level of CG disclosure among firms
(Bouwman, 2011). Researchers found corporate ownership and board characteristics as leading
determinants for quality and level of CG disclosure (Chalevas, 2011; Nadeem, Zongjun, & Shoaib,
2013; Samaha et al., 2012). Scholars argued that strong CG practices improve quality of disclosure
and financial reporting and increase the investors' confidence which reduces their required rate of
return.
Block holders have more funds to support the firm financially and can improve firm performance
(Chen, Chen, & Wei, 2009). In contrast, researchers also documented that large shareholders can
expropriate corporate resources and small shareholders through conspiracy with managers (Ntim,
Lindop, Osei, & Thomas, 2015). In literature, the empirical studies documented negative or no
association of block holder ownership with level of CG disclosure. It is deliberated that high
profitability is associated with high risk. Therefore, high COC means a high rate of return in the
form of compensation. Hail and Leuz (2006) documented that block ownership has a direct link
with COC as compared to the firm value and financial performance. Prior studies found mixed
results while examining the relationship between block ownership and COC. Pham et al. (2012)
found a negative relationship between block holder ownership and weighted average cost of
capital (WACC) in Australian firms, while Bozec, Laurin, and Meier (2014) found a positive relation-
ship between block ownership and WACC. In a similar vein, Elston and Rondi (2007) also found
a positive link between concentrated insider ownership and COC in Italian firms while found no
relationship in German firms.
It is documented that government ownership is a key factor in emerging countries that can
influence CG disclosure due to the prevalence of high ownership concentration (Cornett, Guo,
Khaksari, & Tehranian, 2010). From a resource theory perspective, Eng and Mak (2003) argued
that firms can easily get financing from the government in case of high government ownership.
Consequently, firms can raise financing on minimum rate, and overall firm COC will decrease which
will ultimately increase the firm value. They also documented that government ownership firms
can create agency problem, and this can lead to poor CG practices (Konijn, Kräussl, & Lucas, 2011).
Therefore, it might create information asymmetry among outsiders and controlling investors and
can increase the COC. The government can employ the CEO and directors on their political
connections rather than on merit (Cornett et al., 2010). Therefore, CEOs have to improve firm
performance in order to protect their reputation and career growth (Conyon & He, 2011).
Researchers documented that institutional investors are more proficient to monitor and improve
CG disclosure (Barako et al., 2006). Jensen and Meckling (1976) documented that monitoring is
helpful in reducing conflicts between investors and directors (Solomon, 2010). Chung and Zhang
(2011) argued that institutional investors have more stronger spur to protect investment mainly
when exist is costly for the firm. Consequently, they also ensure a high level of accountability
between top management and shareholders (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, & Matos, 2011; Haniffa &
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Hudaib, 2006). Only few studies have been conducted to investigate the relationship between
institutional investors and COC. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) investigated the impact of institu-
tional ownership over bond yield and rating by taking a sample of over 1,000 bond issue from
1991, and they found an inverse relationship between bond yield and institutional ownership while
positive relationship between institutional investors and bond ratings. In a similar vein, Piot and
Missonier-Piera (2009) conducted a study to examine the relationship between cost of debt (COD)
and institutional ownership by taking a sample of 102 French listed firms over the period of 1999–
2001. The findings of their study showed a negative relationship between institutional investors
and COD.
The board of directors (BoDs) play a significant role in CG disclosure and firm policies (Chalevas,
2011; Eng & Mak, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Consequently, CG disclosure can improve CG
practices (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) and monitoring of directors (Eng & Mak, 2003). On the other
hand, director ownership affects the outside shareholders and directors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Moreover, if the interests of shareholders and directors are aligned, directors seek to improve
transparency and disclosure. Directors can use firm’s resources for their personal benefits as
compared to outside shareholders and creditors due to having more information (Bebchuk &
Weisbach, 2010); it means they may shift the risk rather than share the risk. Moreover, the high
level of director ownership nurtures the chances of conflicts between management and directors.
Due to high level of information asymmetry, the COC may increase. Hence, a high level of director
ownership may have a high COC and, ultimately, a low profitability and firm value.
Keeping in view the agency perspective, researchers documented that shareholders select
directors to represent their interests and expect a high level of disclosure from directors
(Davidson, Nemec, & Worrell, 1996). Board size is a decisive factor in monitoring the management
behavior as advised by agency theory (Allegrini & Greco, 2013). Moreover, Ntim and Soobaroyen
(2013) found a positive influence of increased managerial monitoring on voluntary CG disclosure.
In literature, researchers also documented that knowledgeable, experienced and independent
directors are important for CG disclosure and more relevant to board size (Haniffa & Cooke,
2002). The prior empirical studies indicated a positive association between board size and CG
disclosure. Samaha et al. (2012) also found that those firms tend to disclose more CG information
which have a larger board as compared to their smaller counterparts. Additionally, Allegrini and
Greco (2013) also documented that larger boards tend to disclose more information about
strategic objectives of firms in contrast to smaller boards. BoDs play a pivotal role in mitigating
the agency costs and effective operation of firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In contrast, the cost
of managerial activities may arise due to the presence of more board members which can increase
the COC and adversely affect firm value (Yawson, 2006). On the other hand, researchers also
documented that large boards can increase firm value due to having access to critical resources
and ability to appeal experienced and qualified directors (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013); nevertheless,
resource dependence theory suggests a negative relationship between board size and firm COC.
Pfeffer (1972) documented that large board can represent wide stakeholders and communicate to
majority shareholders and investors easily that can reduce the COC. The literature is scarce on
investigating the relationship between board size and COC, and most of the prior studies investi-
gated the association between board size and cost of equity (COE) or COD and found a negative
relationship between board size and COE (Shah & Butt, 2009). Similarly, Bozec and Bozec (2011)
conducted a study in Canada to investigate the association between CGI and COC. By taking
a sample of 155 listed firms over the year 2002–2005, they documented the inverse association
of CGIwith COE and COD. As CG compliance increases, COE and COD decrease.
Literature provides the evidence of mixed results in determining the nexus between board
diversity and CG disclosure. Bear, Rahman, and Post (2010) argued that board diversity improves
the CG compliance and disclosure by monitoring managers to protect shareholders' interests
from agency theory perspective while ensuring the provisions of resources from resource
dependence theory perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Some researchers found that female
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directors have effect on firms’ board (Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Yu, Lord, Peni,
& Vähämaa, 2010), while some argued that gender diversity can improve CG disclosure due to
unique methods to information disclosure (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). A number of
researchers investigated the impact of board gender diversity on financial performance (Rose,
2007) and managerial and corporate decisions (Ntim, 2015). Adams and Ferreira (2009) con-
ducted a study in the US and reported that female board members have a significant impact on
board inputs and outputs. They also documented that female attendance was high in board
meetings as compared to male board members. Consequently, this participation in board
meeting can increase the communication between stakeholders that can moderate COC and
risk shifting. Nielsen and Huse (2010) conducted a study among 201 Norwegian firms and
documented that firm value may be affected in the absence of female BoDs that can increase
COC. Moreover, they also documented that the presence of women on corporate boards’
increases board effectiveness through ensuring high quality of board development activities
and reducing the level of conflict among stakeholders.
The empirical literature documented positive or no significant relationship between the
quality of external auditing and CG disclosure. Ntim and Danbolt (2012) documented
a positive relationship between the level of CG disclosure and audit firm size among South
African firms. In a similar vein, Schiehll, Terra, and Victor (2013) documented that big four audit
firms tend to increase executive stock option disclosure among Brazilian firms. Alsaeed (2006)
conducted a study among Saudi firms and found no significance of audit firms on the level of
CG disclosure.
Big audit firms provide good quality audits as compared to small audit firms due to having
qualified auditors, resources, reputation and experience (DeAngelo, 1981). Due to good reputation
and influence, big audit firms can compel firms to disclose information to reduce information
asymmetry which helps in building investors’ confidence and reduces COC. Furthermore, Diamond
(1989) reported that the acquisition of reputation reduces the COD for firm and eventually COC.
Pittman and Fortin (2004) conducted a study to investigate the impact of auditor choice on debt
pricing in firms’ early public years and found that big auditing firms can increase the reliability of
annual reports and reduce monitoring cost that enables firms to reduce COD.
2.4. Nexus between CGI and COC
Prior literature highlights that most of the studies examined the association between individual
CG mechanisms and COC (Ashbaugh, Collins, & LaFond, 2004; Shah & Butt, 2009). Chen et al.
(2009) found that companies with poor CG transparency and disclosure face more COE.
Researchers recommended to consider CG mechanism as an index to determine the nexus
between CG and COC (Bozec & Bozec, 2011). Chen and Yuan (2004) conducted a study to
investigate the relationship between CG disclosure and COE capital. They found a negative
relationship between CG disclosure and COE in emerging economies. They also reported that
country-level legal protection and CG disclosure play a complementary role in reducing the COE
capital. It is also evident from existing literature that strong CG practices enhance the quality of
financial reporting that leads towards reducing monitoring cost and investors’ required rate of
return (Zhu, 2014). However, existing literature is limited to developed countries (such as the US,
Australia, Canada, etc.), and only few studies have been conducted in developing countries
(Chen, Wei, & Chen, 2003). Similarly, question arises that how CG practices affect the COC under
variations in market risk across firms and countries (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007; Teti,
Dell’Acqua, Etro, & Resmini, 2016)? In addition, Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) argued that quality
of accounting income is lower in emerging markets and comprises of a major portion of
portfolio; consequently, the information risk is higher in emerging markets as compared to
developed markets. Thus, diversification and estimation of risk are difficult in emerging markets,
and marginal benefits of CG disclosure might be greater in reducing the COC (Chen et al., 2003).
It is also evident from existing literature that disclosure is acknowledged as fundamental part of
CG research (Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006; Durnev & Kim, 2005; Mitton, 2002) and in surveys
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(Analysis & Research, 1989; Asia, 2001; Patel & Dallas, 2002). Therefore, the relationship
between CG disclosure and COC might change by controlling CG mechanisms. Hence, need
arises to investigate the nexus between CG practices (CGI) and COC because the COC is
a more direct measure of firm’s financing cost than firm value. Thus, this study employs the
CGI to determine the nexus between CG and COC among PSX listed firms.
The next section provides detailed methodology including population, sample size, data sources,
construction of CGI, control variables, measurement for COC, operationalization of variables and
analytical tools.
3. Methodology
3.1. Population and sample
The population of this study included all the listed firms of PSX. The sample comprised of 120 PSX
listed firms over the period 2009–2015 (Table 1). This sample was selected on the basis of one
criterion. Only those non-financial listed firms were selected whose annual reports were available
from 2009 to 2015. The study excludes the financial firms as their capital and profitability
structures are quite different. This seven years of data window makes 840 observations.
3.2. Data sources
The data was collected from annual reports for CG, financial and stock market variables. The data was
collected manually from annual reports which were downloaded from PSX and companies’ websites.
3.3. Self-constructed CG index
In literature, self-constructed and analyst ratings have been used to measure CG disclosure
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). The self-constructed index is developed from country CG standards and
provisions in order to examine different issues. Some researchers used self-constructed CGI (Javid
& Iqbal, 2008a; Tariq & Abbas, 2013), while some used analyst rating indices (Clacher, Doriye, &
Hillier, 2008; Henry, 2008) to investigate the relationship between CG and corporate policy
decisions.
This study developed and employed a self-constructed binary CGI to determine CG compliance
and disclosure among PSX listed firms due to several reasons. The analyst rating indices are
developed by professional organizations keeping in view the CG principles of developed countries.
Those developed countries’ CG indices are not much applicable to a developing country due to
differences in their socioeconomic factors (Arslan & Roudaki, 2017). Moreover, the analyst rating
Table 1. Industry-wise distribution of sample firms
Industry No. of sample firms
Textile 24
Automobile and engineering 19
Chemical 14
Cement 12
Oil and gas 11
Food and beverages 10
Electricity and electronics 9
Household 8
Pharmaceutical 6
Sugar 5
Misc. 2
Total 120
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indices are largely based on board characteristics and shareholding patterns (Chung & Zhang,
2011), while self-constructed CGI consists of all the CG aspects suggested by literature and
country CG standards. The CGI of this study has five elements, i.e. BoDs (20 provisions), internal
control (18 provisions), transparency and disclosure (16 provisions), auditing and committees (15
provisions) and shareholders rights (6 provisions), and that contains overall 75 CG provisions. Due
to lack of standard criterion and theoretical support of index, CGI is developed in line with prior
studies (Javid & Iqbal, 2008b; Khan, 2016; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; Samaha et al., 2012; Tariq &
Abbas, 2013).
3.4. Control variables
To control the endogeneity issue and statistical problems, this study used different measures and
took firm size, leverage, growth and profitability as control variables.
The firm size is taken as control variable in this study and is measured by the natural log of
total assets (LTA). Samaha et al. (2012) documented firm size and leverage as determinants
of good CG practices. Moreover, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) documented a positive relation-
ship between ROE and firm size. In addition, leverage (LEV) is measured through the debt
ratio and employed as a control variable in this study. Due to the influential positive effect of
growth in CG disclosure (Ntim & Danbolt, 2012), it is taken as a control variable for this study
and measured by current year’s sales minus last year sales divided by the last year sales
(GWTH). Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2006) argued that the adaptation of
good CG practice is pivotal to minimize the COC by attracting more capital. Ntim and
Soobaroyen (2013) found that profitable firms disclose more information as compared to
their counterparts. Empirically, a negative relationship is reported between performance and
COC in the literature (Zhu, 2014) by using ROE as a proxy of profitability.
3.5. Model specification
Following models are estimated to investigate the determinants of CGI and nexus between CGI
and COC in this study:
CGIit ¼ α0 þ β1DOWNit þ β2IOWNit þ β3BOWNit þ β4GOWNit þ β5BG4it þ β6BSZit þ β7GENDit
þ β8LTAit þ β9ROEit þ β10GWTHit þ β11LEVit þ μit ðModel 1Þ
COCit ¼ α0 þ β1CGIit þ β2DOWNit þ β3IOWNit þ β4BOWNit þ β5GOWNit þ β6BG4it þ β7BSZit
þ β8GENDit þ β9LTAit þ β10ROEit þ β11GWTHit þ β12LEVit
þ μit ðModel 2Þ
where, CGI represents the corporate governance compliance index and comprises of 75 provisions
from both CCG 2002 and CCG 2012, a binary coding is applied, 1 if company follows the CG
provision in annual report, otherwise 0; COC represents the weighted average COC; DOWN, IOWN
and GOWN represent the percentage of director ownership, percentage of institutional ownership
and percentage of government ownership, respectively, with regard to total shares of the firm.
BOWN represents block holder ownership and percentage of shares held by shareholders with at
least 5% of the total shares. BG4 represents the big four audit firms and calculated by binary
coding. BSZ represents the board size and calculated by number of directors on the board of firm at
the time of annual general meeting (AGM), while GEND represents the presence of female board
member and calculated using binary coding. LTA, ROE, GWTH and LEV represent the control
variables used in the study.
To control endogeneity, this study employed multiple linear regression analysis by employing two-
stage ordinary least square regression (2SLS) to examine the relationship. Regarding model 1, each of
seven CG variables
(β1DOWNit þ β2IOWNit þ β3BOWNit þ β4GOWNit þ β5BG4it þ β6BSZit þ β7GENDit) is regressed over
control variable (e.g. P CG variables ¼ a0 þ∑ni¼1βiControlsit þ εit) and their predicted values are saved
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in the first stage. In the second stage, model 1 is re-estimated by replacing the seven CG variables with
their predicted values as following in model 1(a):
CGIit ¼ α0 þ β1DOWNit þ β2IOWNit þ β3BOWNit þ β4GOWNit þ β5BG4it þ β6BSZit þ β7GENDit
þ β8LTAit þ β9ROEit þ β10GWTHit þ β11LEVit
þ μit Model 1ðaÞ
In model 2, CGI is assumed as an exogenous variable and may produce biased results; hence, an
instrument variable (I-CGI) is created by performing regression analysis between CGI and alternate
CG variables like gender diversity (GEND), board size (BSZ) and board meeting frequency (BMF)
while keeping the same control variables for model 2. These variables are selected with the
support of existing literature (Ntim & Danbolt, 2012; Tariq & Abbas, 2013) and the availability of
data. Equation 1 represents this regression, where predicted values of CGI are saved as I-CGI and
R-CGI.
CGIit ¼ α0 þ β1BSZit þ β2GENDit þ β3BMFit þ β4LTAit þ β5ROEit þ β6GWTHit þ β7LEVit
þ μit ðequation 1Þ
I-CGI will be a valid instrument if it reveals a significant association with CGI and insignificant
association with R-CGI. The decision is made on correlation matrix of CGI, I-CGI and R-CGI
(see Table 2).
As shown in Table 2, I-CGI is a valid instrument as it has a significant relationship with CGI while
insignificant with R-CGI. Hence, this instrument variable (I-CGI) is used in model 2 in place of CGI
as shown below:1
COCit ¼ α0 þ β1I CGIit þ β2DOWNit þ β3IOWNit þ β4BOWNit þ β5GOWNit þ β6BG4it þ β7BSZit
þ β8GENDit þ β9LTAit þ β10ROEit þ β11GWTHit þ β12LEVit þ μit ðModel 2aÞ
4. Results and discussion
The results and discussion are presented in this section. First, the descriptive statistics of overall CG
compliance and disclosure among PSX listed firms are presented. Second, this section expounds
the descriptive statistics of all the variables. The correlation matrix is also presented in this section.
In the end, findings of 2SLS representing the determinants of CG compliance and disclosure (model
1a) and nexus between CGI and COC (model 2a) are presented.
Table 2. Correlation matrix between CGI, I-CGI and R-CGI
CGI I-CGI R-CGI
CGI Pearson correlation 1.000 0.091*** 0.975***
Sig. (two-tailed) 0.000 0.000
N 840 840 840
I-CGI Pearson correlation 0.091*** 1.000 0.000
Sig. (two-tailed) 1.000
N 840 840 840
R-CGI Pearson correlation 0.975*** 1.000
Sig. (two-tailed) 0.000 1.000
N 840 840 840
***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). CGI = corporate governance index, I-CGI = standardized
predicted value and R-CGI denotes standardized residual.
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4.1. Descriptive statistics of CGI
The self-constructed binary CGI determines the level of CG compliance and disclosure among PSX
listed firms and comprises of 75 provisions. Figure 1 reveals the level of CG compliance from
the year 2009 to 2015 among PSX listed firms.
The finding of CG compliance reveals that the level of CG compliance and disclosure has
improved over the period of 2009–2015. It can be seen that the mean value of CGI increased
from 51% to 89% from 2009 to 2015. The finding reveals that overall increase in CG compliance is
38% over seven years which is in line with other emerging economies’ studies (Akhtaruddin,
Hossain, Hossain, & Yao, 2009; Ntim & Danbolt, 2012; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). Three possible
reasons for this increase are (1) suitability of Anglo American model in Pakistan, (2) the CG
compliance and disclosure has become mandatory for PSX listed firms after issuance of recent
reform in 2012 according to legal requirements of PSX listing regulations and Companies
Ordinance Act and (3) level of awareness has increased among stakeholder of PSX listed firms.
The firms who failed to follow CG principles were delisted from PSX (Pakistan Stock Exchange, n.d.).
The descriptive statistics of overall CGI and its sub-indices are presented in Table 3. The mean
score of CGI ranges from 50.7 to 89.3 over the period of 2009–2015 with an average of 74% for 75
CG provisions. The standard deviation (SD) of CGI is 22.48% which represents the dispersal in CG
compliance level. A possible reason for increase in the level of CG compliance over a period of
seven years is due to increase in the level of awareness and appreciation among stakeholders
about CG principles.
Table 4 reveals the descriptive statistics of all the variables including CGI, COC, explanatory and
control variables. The finding reveals that CGI has a mean value of 73.8% with a maximum value of
99.5% and a minimum value of 0%. The variation among 840 firm-year observation is high as SD is
24.1%. These findings are supported by previous CG studies (Henry, 2008; Ntim & Danbolt, 2012).
The mean value of COC is 0.212, while the variation of COC is high among PSX listed firms as SD is
24.3%. The block ownership is having a mean score of 54.50% with maximum of 99.60% and
minimum of 0%. This indicates the high ownership concentration among PSX listed firms and
posits a low level of CG compliance and disclosure. These findings are supported by existing CG
studies (Attiya et al., 2008; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). The director ownership is having a mean score of
19.64% with maximum of 98.97% and minimum of 0%. This level of director ownership is quite
high as compared to both developed and developing countries. Henry (2008) found 6% of the
director ownership among Australian firms, while Samaha et al. (2012) found 9% among Egyptian
firms. The mean score of government ownership is 5.44% with maximum of 94.82% and minimum
of 0%. This reveals a high level of government ownership and involvement among PSX listed firms
which can have an impact on inclination about CG practices and compliance of the firm. The mean
score of institutional ownership is 9.46% with maximum of 96.07% and minimum of 0%. These
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Figure 1. Level of compliance
among PSX listed firms.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of CGI and sub-indices
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
CGI
Mean 50.7 57.2 71.6 77.9 82.1 88.1 89.3
Median 51.9 59.5 77.9 85.5 89.9 94.7 95.6
Maximum 81.2 83.1 89.6 94.8 97.8 98.9 99.5
Minimum 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.8 5.9 8.1 9.7
SD 19.1 19.9 24.4 26.2 26.6 21.2 20.0
CG
provisions
75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0
Board of directors
Mean 53.13 58.55 69.45 74.83 78.24 82.65 83.93
Median 52.78 60.9 79.03 85.59 89.96 95.28 95.59
Maximum 77.74 82.35 89.64 92.8 96.35 97.63 98.43
Minimum 15.8 19.41 17.01 20.14 21.45 39.56 41.02
SD 17.87 18.52 22.07 22.89 23.89 21.91 19.92
CG
provisions
20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Shareholders rights
Mean 53.13 61.46 82.19 90.11 96.67 98.13 98.25
Median 53 61.43 82.37 90.5 97.37 99.56 99.87
Maximum 53.6 61.1 81.1 89.23 94.85 97.37 97.35
Minimum 48.08 56.2 76.83 84.95 90.58 94.95 94.33
SD 1.62 1.46 1.26 1.31 1.54 0.72 1.1
CG
provisions
6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Transparency and disclosure
Mean 54.43 60.5 72.82 78.36 80.99 83.04 83.44
Median 56.69 64.81 83.25 90.44 92.94 95.12 95.12
Maximum 81.23 83.1 88.1 93.1 96.23 98.73 98.73
Minimum 14.4 17.53 21.28 22.53 24.4 25.65 26.9
SD 19.29 19.6 22.21 24.14 24.9 25.35 24.78
CG
provisions
16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Committees and audit
Mean 33.73 38.91 50.34 55.61 60.03 79.58 83.15
Median 38.6 43.91 60.16 68.29 72.35 84.85 87.98
Maximum 62.35 66.4 84.23 94.82 97.78 98.89 99.49
Minimum 4.56 4.75 5 5.81 5.88 8.1 9.65
SD 22.75 24.225 32.565 35.93 35.75 23.79 22.96
CG
provisions
15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Internal control
Mean 59.2 66.42 83.12 90.41 94.79 97.25 97.84
Median 58.54 66.66 84.48 92.6 96.66 98.85 99.48
Maximum 68.71 73.08 87.46 93.71 96.83 98.71 98.71
Minimum 21.73 26.73 33.6 39.23 44.85 47.98 52.98
SD 10.45 10.59 12.43 12.76 12.28 12.08 10.93
CG
provisions
18 18 18 18 18 18 18
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findings of institutional ownership are supported by studies of Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Chung &
Zhang (2011). The gender diversity is 11.45% which reveals the presence of female director on
board. It can be noteworthy to say that female directors can play a pivotal role in improving the CG
compliance among PSX listed firms. These findings are supported by Adams and Ferreira (2009).
The result indicates that 57.1% of PSX listed firms use the services of big audit firms. However, this
percentage is still less than that in other developing country studies. In a similar vein, Barako et al.
(2006) conducted a study to investigate the use of big audit firms by Kenyan firms. They found that
75% of the sampled firms were using big audit firms. Literature provides the evidence that audit
firm reputation can play a remarkable effect on CG compliance and reduce COC. The average board
size is 8.22 which are within range of 6–17. These findings are well supported by Akhtaruddin et al.
(2009) who found average board size of 7.97 among Malaysian firms. Moreover, this also fulfills the
requirement of SECP CCG that board size should be at least seven (7). The average score of firm size
is 15.96 with maximum value of 21.27 and minimum of 12.60. The average score of growth is
15.2% with maximum value of 1.644 and minimum of −0.739, while the average score of profit-
ability (ROE) is 13.4% with maximum of 19% and minimum of −22%. In the end, the average score
of leverage is 29.31% which is a bit higher than prior developing country studies (see Barako et al.,
2006).
4.2. Correlation matrix
Table 5 reveals the correlation matrix between variables. It is evident from correlation matrix that
most of the variables have a significant high correlation with each other. So, there may be multi-
collinearity between the variables. However, findings reveal that the correlation coefficient of 0.281
between DOWN and GEND and 0.528 between IOWN and BOWN reveals no serious problem of
multicollinearity.
4.3. Results of model 1
Table 6 reveals the results of 2SLS for CGI and COC. Model 1(a) presents the results related to the
determinants of CGI.
The value of adjusted R2 is 50.2 which reveals that 50.2% variation in CGI is explained by these
explanatory variables, while remaining 49.8% is explained by other factors. Moreover, the value of
F-stats (55.254) reveals the fitness of the model as it is above 20. Findings reveal that director
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables
Variables Observations Mean Median Std. Maximum Minimum
CGI 840 73.8 77.9 24.1 99.5 0
COC 840 0.212 0.158 0.243 0.968 −0.41
BOWN 840 54.501 55.162 27.577 99.606 0
DOWN 840 19.649 8.943 23.581 98.971 0
GOWN 840 5.447 1.683 13.414 94.823 0
IOWN 840 9.469 5.485 13.444 96.071 0
GEND 840 11.451 0 23.376 1 0
BG4 840 0.571 1 0.498 1 0
BSZ 840 8.22 8 1.683 17 6
LTA 840 15.967 15.591 2.052 21.274 12.606
GRWTH 840 0.152 0.115 0.378 1.644 −0.739
ROE 840 0.134 0.091 0.211 0.19 −0.224
LEV 840 29.315 24.393 29.031 146.417 0
CGI = CG index, COC = cost of capital, BOWN = Block ownership, DOWN = Director Ownership, GOWN = Government
Ownership, IOWN = Institutional Ownership, GEND = Gender diversity, BG4 = Big four audit firms, BSZ = Board size, LTA
= Firm size, GRWTH = Growth rate, ROE = Profitability, LEV = leverage.
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ownership has a positive association with CG compliance and disclosure; moreover, BoDs may
improve the level of CG compliance and disclosure. These results are well supported by Samaha
et al. (2012). A significant positive relationship is found between institutional ownership and CG
compliance and disclosure that supports the argument that a high level of institutional ownership in
firms can improve the level of CG compliance in Pakistan. Aggarwal et al. (2011) found the similar
results in their study and documented that accountability increases in the presence of institutional
ownership. Moreover, they also documented that institutions have experience, knowledge and
resources which can help them in improving CG compliance directly or indirectly. In addition,
Barako et al. (2006) argued that institutions demand a high level of CG compliance to reduce their
monitoring costs. This finding is also supported by prior studies (Chung & Zhang, 2011; Ntim &
Danbolt, 2012). Similarly, a positive relationship is also found between government ownership and
the level of CG compliance and disclosure. These findings are in line with the study conducted by
Conyon and He (2011) who also found the same findings in their study on a Chinese dataset. In
contrast, a negative relationship is found between block ownership and level of CG compliance and
disclosure. In Pakistan, the ownership concentration is quite high, and consequently, it may influence
management to disclose less information and expropriate minority shareholders due to the weak
legal system and lack of protection of minority shareholders. These findings are supported by several
studies on emerging markets (Alsaeed, 2006; Khan, 2014; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010). The findings
reveal an insignificant positive association between audit firm size and level of CG compliance and
disclosure. Literature provides the evidence that audit firm size may have a positive effect on CG
compliance, and large audit firms have high auditing standards and demand for high level of CG
compliance and disclosure (Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 2006). Due to the high level of family and
block ownership, auditing firms are less influential in Pakistan for improvement of CG compliance and
disclosure. The board size and gender diversity have a negative association with level of CG com-
pliance and disclosure. Hence, it is argued that the level of CG compliance and disclosure improve in
Table 6. Results of determinants of CGI (model 1a) and nexus between CGI and COC (model 2a)
DV = CGI DV = COC
Model 1(a) Model 2(a)
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
Constant 1.6214 0.201 0.596214 6.30255
CGI −0.004081* −2.298154
DOWN 0.023 0.798 0.000905 2.808574
IOWN 0.13* 2.381 0.000498 1.04044
GOWN 0.301 4.132 0.001103 1.805421
BOWN −0.022** −1.964 −0.000319* −2.854172
BG4 0.481 0.321 −0.013902 −0.908541
BSZ −0.699** −1.812 −0.001412 −0.299789
GEND −0.704** −0.498 −0.00301 −0.148147
LTA 1.501 3.798 −0.017801 −4.653324
ROE −3.617 −1.389 −0.001232 −2.707919
GRWTH 0.91 0.557 −0.009025 −0.594175
LEV 0.01 0.429 −0.000762 −7.909152
Adjusted R2 0.502 0.3254
F-stat 55.254 31.49512
Observations 840 840
COC = cost of capital, CGI = CG index, DOWN = Director Ownership, IOWN = Institutional Ownership, GOWN =
Government Ownership, BOWN = Block ownership, BG4 = Big four audit firms, BSZ = Board size, GEND = Gender
diversity, LTA = Firm size, ROE = Profitability, GRWTH = Growth rate, LEV = leverage; * and ** denote 5% and 10% level
of significance, respectively.
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the presence of small board due to strong coordination. These findings are not consistent with
findings of existing studies (see Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ntim & Danbolt, 2012). The findings reveal
that there is an insignificant but positive relationship of control variables like firm size, growth and
leverage with the level of CG compliance and disclosure, while the negative association is found with
ROE. These findings are also supported by prior studies (Ntim & Danbolt, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012).
4.4. Results of model 2(a)
Model 2(a) presents the results regarding nexus between the level of CG compliance and disclosure
with COC. The value of adjusted R2 is 32.54 which reveals that 32.54% variation in COC is explained by
these explanatory variables, while remaining 67.46% is explained by other factors. Moreover, the
value of F-stats (31.49512) reveals the fitness of the model as it is above 20. The findings reveal that
CGI has a significant negative relationship with COC which means the COC decreases with increase in
the level of CG compliance and disclosure. Although the literature is limited in examining the nexus
between CG and COC, this finding of significant negative association is supported by prior studies
(Bozec & Bozec, 2011; Chen et al., 2009; Shah & Butt, 2009). The findings reveal an insignificant
positive association of director, institutional and government ownership with COC among PSX listed
firms. It means that director, institutional and government ownerships are not able to explain
variation in COC. Agency theory supports these findings and documents more agency problems
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) due to high level of director ownership and government ownership. In
contrast, the block ownership has a significant negative association with COC. It means the COC
decreases with increase in block ownership among PSX listed firms. Bozec et al. (2014) and Pham
et al. (2012) also found similar results in their studies. There is a negative association between audit
firm size and COC among PSX listed firms. It means that those firms bear less COC whose accounts
are audited by big audit firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976) documented that external auditors can
play a pivotal role in mitigating agency conflicts and improving CG compliance. In a similar vein, audit
firms can help in the reduction of information asymmetry which ultimately reduces COC (Beatty,
1989; DeAngelo, 1981). Additionally, those firms have fewer problems of CG compliance and dis-
closure that are audited by big audit firms which increases the investors’ confidence and reduces COC.
The findings reveal a negative association of board size and gender diversity with COC. It means firms
with large board size may bear less COC as compared to firms with smaller boards in Pakistan. These
findings are supported by literature (Bozec & Bozec, 2011; Shah & Butt, 2009). Moreover, findings
reveal that firms with a higher level of female board members have a lower COC than those with less
or no female board members. These findings are also supported by existing literature (see Nielsen &
Huse, 2010). The study finds a negative relationship of all four control variables, i.e. firm size, growth,
ROE and leverage with COC. These findings are in line with previous studies (Bozec et al., 2010; Pham
et al., 2012).
5. Conclusions
The objective of this study was to investigate the determinants of the level of CG compliance and
disclosure and nexus between CG compliance and COC among PSX listed firms. The study employed
2SLS by drawing a sample of 120 PSX listed firms over seven years from 2009 to 2015. The binary
CGI is developed, comprising of 75 provisions from CG standards of both CCG 2002 and recent reform
in 2012.
The findings of this study reveal that the average score of CGI has improved from 51% to 89%
over the period of 2009–2015. The finding reveals that overall increase in CG compliance is 38% in
these seven years which is in line with other emerging economies' studies (Akhtaruddin et al.,
2009; Ntim & Danbolt, 2012; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). Results reveal that block ownership has
a significant negative association with CG compliance and COC. It concludes that PSX listed firms
having a high level of block ownership are less intended to conform to CG principles as compared
to those having a low level of block ownership, and firms having a high level of block ownership
have a lower COC as compared to those having a low level of block ownership.
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A positive association is found between government ownership and CG compliance. It is docu-
mented that PSX listed firms with more government ownership are likely to fulfill more CG
principles as compared to those with a low level of government ownership. However, the insignif-
icant positive association is found between government ownership and COC. It documents that
government ownership has no explanatory power to explain variation in COC. Institutional own-
ership has a significant positive association with CG compliance while insignificant with COC. It
documents that PSX listed firms having a high level of institutional ownership are intended to fulfill
more CG principles as compared to those having a low level of institutional ownership, and
institutional ownership has no explanatory power to explain variation in COC.
Findings reveal that director ownership has a positive association with CG compliance and COC.
It is suggested that BoDs may improve CG compliance and disclosure among PSX listed firms and
lower COC. The negative association is found between board size and CG compliance. These
findings are not consistent with findings of existing studies (see Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ntim &
Danbolt, 2012). The negative association is also found between board size and COC. It means that
firms with large board size may bear less COC as compared to firms with smaller boards in
Pakistan. Gender diversity has a negative association with CG compliance and COC. It means
that PSX listed firms with a higher level of female board members have a lower COC than those
with less or no female board members. While the negative assoication between gender diversity
and CG compliance may be due to absence of voicing mechanism and females' participation at
AGMs. Audit firm size has a positive association with CG compliance while negative association
with COC. It means those firms bear less COC whose accounts are audited by big audit firms.
In the end, the negative association is found between CGI and COC. It means that as CG
compliance and disclosure increases, COC decreases. The results of the control variables are
mixed and supported by the literature.
5.1. Significance and implications of the study
This study contributes to existing CG literature. It is found that most of the existing studies focused
on developed markets and literature is scarce in developing markets. Therefore, this study con-
tributes to the existing literature, especially in emerging markets. A significant arising implication
of the paper is that firms of emerging countries should pay higher attention to CG issues to enjoy
a lower COC. The efficient management of this matter is of critical significance in the creation of
firm value. Since the firm’s COC is a more direct measure of firm's value, the findings of this study
are important for emerging markets, particularly Pakistan. Thus, this study provides more evidence
in support of strong CG practices in Pakistan and overall Asia’s emerging markets due to similar
socioeconomic context.
5.2. Limitations and directions for future research
Although this study is comprehensive, it still has some limitations. Due to the lack of organized
data, this study used data of 120 PSX listed firms while total population size is 5792.
Consequently, this may limit the generalizability of the findings of this study. Future research
can be done by taking data from all the PSX listed firms. This study excludes financial firms due
to their different capital and profitability structures. Only seven years of data from 2009 to 2015
was collected while SECP introduced CCG in 2002; future researchers can collect data over
a longer period of time.
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